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Abstract
In this paper we estimate the income distributional effects of the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) for farmers and landowners. First, we theoretically analyse the level of farmers' and 
landowners' gains from coupled and decoupled payments. Second, using a unique farm level 
panel data set from the FADN for the period 1995-2007 we employ the fixed effects, the 
Heckman selection bias and the GMM estimators to estimate income distributional effects of 
CAP subsidies. The results do not confirm the theoretical hypothesis that landowners benefit a 
large share of the CAP subsidies. According to our estimates, farmers gain between 60% to 
95%, 80% to 178% and 86% to 90% of the total value of coupled crop/animal, coupled RDP 
and decupled payments, respectively. The CAP subsidies are only marginally capitalised in 
land rents. Our results suggest that the rental rates are more responsive to structural variables 
and show a strong time dependency, suggesting the presence of rigidities in the EU rental 
markets, which constraint the adjustment of land rents to market signals and thus reduce 
landowners' gains from the CAP. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU agricultural sector receives more than 50 billion Euros (ca. 45% of the EU budget) 
through the CAP subsidies per year. There is an ongoing debate among policy makers and 
scientific community about the actual beneficiaries of the CAP subsidies (or as referred to 
"income distributional effects of subsides"). Even though farmers are the primary recipients of 
the CAP subsidies, various factors may lead to a situation where farmers benefit only part of 
the subsidies or to a situation where farmers do not benefit from the CAP subsidies at all. 
Besides farmers, also other agricultural market participants may partly or fully capture the 
CAP subsidies. Particularly, this might be the case of landowners, consumers, and input 
suppliers. For example, studies from the US show that landowners capture a substantial share 
of subsidies (e.g. Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magné 2005; Kirwan 2005; Lence and Mishra 
2003).
Theoretical studies show that depending on the type of subsidies and formal and informal 
institutions and market distortions, agricultural subsidies may or may not benefit farmers. 
Floyd (1965) was among the first who developed a conceptual model to analyse the income 
distributional effects of agricultural subsidies. The subsequent theoretical literature extended 
Floyd's model with the objective to identify how different types of agricultural policies (e.g. 
direct payments, export subsidies, decoupled subsidies, market price intervention) and other 
factors (e.g. demand and supply elasticities, credit markets, imperfect competition, market 
structure) affect the distributional effects of subsidies (Alston and James 2002; de Gorter and 
Meilke 1989; Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004; Salhofer 1996; Ciaian and 
Swinnen 2009).
The empirical evidence on distributional effects of farm subsidies is considerably scarcer. 
Two types of approaches have been followed in empirical literature. First, econometric 
studies try to estimate the distributional effects of subsidies. The vast majority of these studies 
estimate the capitalisation rate of subsidies into land values (i.e. landowners' policy rents) in 
North America (e.g. Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné 1992; Gardner 2002; Lence and Mishra 
2003; Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins 2003; Kirwan 2005). There are only few studies on the 
capitalisation of the CAP in the EU (Duvivier, Gaspart and de Frahan 2005; Patton et al. 
2008; Kilian et al. 2008).
1 The other strand of empirical literature applies partial equilibrium 
1 With few exceptions (Dewbre and Mishra 2007; Henningsen, Kumbhakar and Lien 2009), the econometric 
estimates on farmers' benefits from subsidies are non-existent. 3
(PE) or general equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate the distributional effects of agricultural 
subsidies (e.g. Dewbre, Anton and Thompson 2001; Gohin and Moschini 2006; Hubbard 
(1995); OECD 2000; Salhofer and Schmid 2004). Although PE and CGE models can capture 
complex interlinkages present in the agricultural markets, the simulated effects heavily 
depend on calibrated or arbitrary assumed elasticities. As a result, the confidence interval of 
these studies is rather big. 
The objective of this study is to assess the distributional effects of the CAP subsidies in the 
EU. First we theoretically analyse the distributional effects of the CAP subsidies for coupled 
crop and animal payments, coupled Rural Development Programme (RDP) (investment 
support, environmental payments, Less Favoured Area (LFA) payments) and decoupled 
payments. These subsidies cover most of the CAP support (around 75% of the total CAP 
expenditures). Our main contribution to the literature is to empirically estimate how benefits 
of different types of the CAP subsidies are distributed between farmers and landowners. 
Employing a unique farm level Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) panel data for the 
period 1995-2007 we are able to empirically estimate the distributional effects by controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. 
2. Theoretical framework 
There is extensive theoretical literature on the distributional effects of agricultural subsidies. 
Most of these studies apply partial equilibrium models either by modelling a representative 
farm or by considering the supply-demand market interactions (e.g. Floyd 1965; Alston and 
James 2002; de Gorter and Meilke 1989; Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004; 
Salhofer 1996; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006, 2009). 
In line with the first approach, in this paper we employ a stylised partial equilibrium model 
with perfect markets, whereby the representative farm's non-increasing to scale production 
technology, ) , ( Z A f , where, f, the quantity of the final product, is assumed to be a function of 
two inputs (land, A, and non-land input, Z , (e.g. labour)) with  0  i f , 0  ii f , 0  ij f ,
2 for 
i, j = A and Z. For simplicity, the entire land is assumed to be owned by landowners, which 
rent it to farms.
3 The representative farm’s profits are given as follows: 
(1) wZ rA Z A pf     ) , (
where p is the price of the final product, r is rental price of land, and w is price of non-land 
input.
                                                
2
i f  and  ij f , ii f  are first and second derivatives of the production function with respect to its arguments, 
respectively.
3 This distinction between landowners and farmers is convenient for our theoretical explanation but is not 
essential for the derived results, because with perfect markets agents are indifferent between renting and owning 
land either with or without subsidies. The landownership affects only the overall farmers’ gain/loss form 
subsidies through their effect on the rental income from land. 4
We analyse two types of CAP subsidies: (i) coupled direct payments and coupled RDP 
measures, and (ii) decoupled direct payments granted to the EU farmers under the CAP. The 
coupled direct payments and the coupled RDP measures include crop area direct payments, 
animal direct payments, investment support, LFA payments, and environmental payments. 
The coupled direct payments are available to farmers in all EU Member States (MS), though 
they were significantly reduced with the introduction of the SPS in 2005. The decoupled CAP 
payments consist of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), and the Single Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS). The SPS was introduced by the 2003 CAP reform and is implemented mainly in the 
Old MS starting from 2005. The SAPS is implemented in the New MS.  
2.1. Coupled CAP payments 
The coupled direct payments change farm profit function (1) as follows: 
(2) Z s w A s r Z A f s p Z A Q ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) (       
The crop coupled direct payments include payments such as compensatory area payments for 
cereals, oilseeds and protein crops, area payment to rice, etc. They are directly coupled to land 
and can be modelled as an area subsidy,  A s , linked to land (e.g. Dewbre et al. 2001; Kilian 
and Salhofer 2008). The coupled animal direct payments include various types of subsidies 
such as suckler cow premium, beef premium, slaughter premium, ewe premium, etc. These 
subsidies are either output (animal) type of payments,  Q s , (e.g. beef premium, slaughter 
premium) or subsidies linked to non-land input,  Z s , (e.g. suckler cow premium, ewe 
premium), which particularly affect the stock of breeding livestock.
Besides the crop and animal coupled direct payments, farmers receive also Rural 
Development Programme (RDP) payments (also known as the “second pillar” CAP policies). 
We study three types of RDP payments: the investment support, the LFA and environmental 
payments. Under the investment support programme farmers can obtain a grant to partly 
finance the costs of capital purchases. The investment support can be modelled as a non-land 
(capital) input subsidy,  Z s , because it reduces the non-land input costs. The LFA is an area 
based payment to farmers located in less productive regions. Similar to the crop area 
payments, it can be modelled as an area subsidy,  A s . The environmental payments are granted 
for a range of farm activities aimed at improving environment on the farm. These payments 
cover additional costs and farm income foregone resulting from these activities. The 
environmental payments affect in particular farm input use, because they are conditional on 
the adoption of environmentally friendly production practices, such as input use reduction, 
organic farming, intensification of livestock, conversion of arable land to grassland, rotation 
measures, and support of biodiversity (European Commission 2005).  These payments can be 
modelled as land or/and non-land input subsidies,  A s , Z s , because they affect all inputs, but 
may not alter farm production level and/or farm income. For example, if the environmental 5
payments cover exactly the additional costs, then their marginal impact on farm behaviour is 
zero.
4
With decoupled subsidies farm and market equilibrium conditions are given as follows: 
(3) A A Q s r f s p    ) (     and     Z Z Q s w f s p    ) (
(4) ) (p D f 
(5) ) (r S A
A 
(6) ) (w S Z
Z 
where D is output demand and 
A S  and 
Z S  are supply functions of land and non-land inputs, 
respectively, with  0   	 	 p D p D , 0 

A




Equations (3) are farm marginal equilibrium conditions derived from maximisation of the 
profit function (2). They determine the farm input demands. Equations (4), (5) and (6) are 
market clearing conditions for output, land, and non-land input, respectively. 
Farm's profit may be altered by subsidies ( i ds d ) for two reasons: first, because farms are 
recipients of the subsidies; and second, because subsidies may affect agricultural output prices 
( i ds dp ), and input prices (i.e. land,  i ds dr and non-land input  i ds dw ). Landowner’s 
income is affected if subsidies affect land rental prices ( i ds dr ). Totally differentiating the 
equilibrium conditions (3) – (6) and solving for  i ds dp , i ds dr , i ds dw , and  i ds d  (for i = 
A, Z, Q), respectively, yields comparative static results, which are summarised in Table 1. 
According to the comparative static results reported in Table 1, the income distributional 
effects of coupled subsidies largely depend on input supply and output demand elasticities. 
The elasticities determine the price adjustments resulting from the subsidy induced input 
supply and output demand changes. Inelastic demand and supply lead to large adjustments in 
prices, implying that subsidies may be leaked from farms to other market participants by 
reducing the price paid by consumers or/and increasing the prices received by input suppliers. 
In the reverse case of elastic demand and supplies, the price response to subsidies is small and 
farmers will likely be the main subsidy beneficiaries. 
The output subsidy, Q s , (column 2 in Table 1) generates gains to landowners through its 
capitalisation into land rents ( 0  i ds dr ). The gain is decreasing in land supply elasticity, 
A
r S
, and increasing in output demand and non-land input supply elasticities,  p D  and 
Z
w S ,
respectively. In empirical studies the land supply elasticity is usually found to be rather low, 
mostly due to natural constraints. Given that the land supply elasticity is rather low,
5
landowners may potentially benefit a substantial share of output subsidies (more than non-
                                                
4 Implicitly it follows that the actual value of environmental payments could be positive, zero or negative 
depending on the size of additional costs induced by the payments. 
5 Based on an extensive literature review Salhofer (2001) concludes that a plausible range of land supply 
elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. Similarly, Abler (2001) finds a plausible range between 0.2 and 0.6 
for the US, Canada and Mexico. 6
land input suppliers).
6 However, landowners do not benefit the full amount of output 
subsidies, as usually it is shared with other market participants. Landowners may benefit full 
value of output subsidies only in an extreme case of fixed land supply and fixed non-land 
input and output prices (i.e. with inelastic land supply and infinitely elastic output demand 
and non-land input supply, respectively). Farmers' gains from an output subsidy depend on 
the extent they are dissipated to landowners ( i ds dr ), non-land suppliers ( i ds dw ) and 
consumers ( i ds dp ), which are largely dependent on the input supply and output demand 
elasticities, respectively (column 2 in Table 1). For example, high output demand and input 
supply elasticities imply that prices are inelastic to output and input quantity adjustments. 
This would imply that in the presence of high elasticities, if the output subsidy induces a 
change in the output and input quantities, the price effects would be minimal and a substantial 
share of subsidies would benefit farmers.
7
The land subsidy ( A s ) likely benefit landowners. Due to the fact that the land subsidy is 
targeted on land, it stimulates farm land demand and in combination with inelastic land 
supply it might be capitalised into higher land rents thus creating leakages of policy rents to 
landowners. In a corner solution, when the land supply is fixed, the land subsidy is fully 
capitalised into land rents (column 3 in Table 1). The impact of land subsidy on farm income 
is ambiguous. Similarly to output subsidy, it depends on the extent it is dissipated to 
landowners ( i ds dr ), non-land suppliers ( i ds dw ) and consumers ( i ds dp ). An important 
determinant of farm gains is output demand elasticity. With inelastic output demand farms 
will likely loose, whereas with elastic output demand farms will likely gain. This is because 
the productivity gain induced by land subsidy is more than offset by output price decrease in 
the former case compared to the latter case. Generally, given that the major part of land 
subsidies are likely dissipated to landowners (because of inelastic land supply), farmers' 
policy benefits/losses from the land subsidy will be minor.  
The non-land input subsidy ( Z s ) has an ambiguous impact on incomes for both landowners 
and farmers. The subsidy reduces the output price because it cuts the marginal costs of 
production and hence boosts farm output. The size of the output price reduction determines 
the policy gains to landowners and farmers. With inelastic output demand landowners and 
farmers will likely loose, whereas with elastic output demand they will likely gain. The 
subsidy gains of landowners decrease and of farmers increase in land supply elasticity. The 
subsidy gains of both landowners and farmers increase in the non-land supply elasticity.  
In summary, the coupled subsidies may result in different policy gains to landowners and 
farmers. Farmers’ gains from subsidies depend on the extent the subsidies affect input and 
                                                
6 Supply elasticities of non-land inputs vary widely between 0.1 and 3 (Balcombe and Prakash 2000; Floyd 
1965; OECD 2000; Thijssen 1988), because it covers a wide range of inputs (e.g. fertilisers, fuel, labour), which 
have various reactions to prices. In relative terms the supply elasticity of non-land inputs is bigger than the 
supply elasticity of land implying lower subsidy gains for non-land input suppliers than for landowners. 
7 Note that farms would benefit full amount of output subsidies only in an extreme case with perfectly elastic 
output demand and input supplies. 7
output prices. In the case the output subsidy farmers gain while in the case of input subsidies 
they may gain or lose.  Landowners will likely benefit from output subsidy and land subsidy 
(because of inelastic land supply). The non-land input subsidy could either confer benefits or 
impose costs to landowners.  
2.2. Decoupled CAP payments 
The CAP implements two types of decoupled direct payments: the SPS and the SAPS. The 
SPS was introduced by the 2003 CAP reform mainly in Old MS. The SAPS is implemented in 
most New MS in 2004.
The SAPS is a payment decoupled from production and it is granted to farmers on per hectare 
basis, however it is coupled to  land use and hence can be modelled as a land subsidy  A s (in 
equation (2)). As a result, the impact of the SAPS on landowners' and farmers' incomes has 
the same effect as the land subsidy impacts discussed above (column 3 in Table 1), whereby 
landowners are likely the main beneficiaries of SAPS due to the inelastic land supply (Ciaian 
and Swinnen 2006).
The distributional effects of the SPS are different. Under the SPS, farm benefits depend on the 
number of entitlements and eligible hectares (s)he possesses. More precisely, the entitlement 
is an asset owned by farmers. However, the entitlements can be activated only if they are 
accompanied by an equal number of eligible hectares.
8
Kilian and Salhofer (2008), Courleux, et al. (2008) and Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2008) 
have derived the income distributional effects of the SPS. They show that the degree to which 
the SPSs benefit landowners or farmers crucially depends on the ratio of entitlements to 
eligible land: i.e. the land capitalisation of the SPS is increasing in the number of entitlements. 
As long as the number of eligible hectares used by farm in the absence of the SPS application 
exceeds the number of entitlements (deficit entitlements), the SPS benefit farms because it 
does not distort land markets. In the opposite case, when the number of entitlements exceeds 
the number of hectares (surplus entitlements), the SPS will alter farms’ land marginal 
condition. In this case the higher is the number of entitlements, the higher is the impact of the 
SPS on land market, and the higher is the capitalisation into land rental prices. If the number 
of entitlements is sufficiently high, then at the margin the SPS creates an equivalent effect as 
the coupled land subsidy,  A s  (Courleux, et al. 2008).
9
In summary, with perfect markets the main part of the SAPS is likely channelled to 
landowners through capitalisation into land rental prices. The distributional effects of the SPS 
are similar to the SAPS if the number of entitlements is in surplus relative to the eligible area. 
                                                
8 See Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2008) for more details on the SPS implementation. 
9 This is the case when the SPS leads to the same equilibrium level of farm land use as an equivalent land 
subsidy. For more on how the implementation details of the SPS affect incomes of farmers and landowners see 
Kilian and Salhofer (2008), Courleux, et al. (2008) and Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2008). 8
In the case of deficiency entitlements relative to the eligible area, the SPS fully benefit 
farmers. 
2.3. Other factors affecting the income distributional effects of the CAP 
In the theoretical analysis above we assumed perfect input and output markets. However, in 
reality rural markets are affected by many other factors, the two most important of which are 
accompanying policy measures and land market institutions and regulations. 
The income distributional effects of subsidies depend particularly on accompanying policy 
measures. In the real world agricultural support policies are combined in policy programmes 
involving multiple instruments implemented in the same time, none of which can be 
considered isolated from the others. For example, both coupled and decoupled CAP payments 
are conditional on the fulfilment of cross-compliance requirements. Farm failure to respect 
these conditions can lead to a reduction or a complete termination of the CAP payments.
10
The conditionality of the CAP payments may mitigate their effects on land rents and farm 
profits due to the fact that the eligibly for subsidy may require farmers to incur certain costs.  
The distributional effects of subsidies can be affected also by market institutions and 
regulations. The rental market regulations in the EU include e.g. rental price restrictions 
(minimum/maximum price) and regulations on the duration of rental contracts (Ciaian, Kancs 
and Swinnen 2010). The rental price restrictions are in general formal imposed by 
government, whereas the duration of rental contracts can be regulated through both formal 
governmental interventions and/or through informal rural market institutions. The minimum 
rental prices reduce land demand if the unregulated market price is lower than the regulated 
price. In contrast, the maximum rental prices reduce land supply, if the unregulated market 
price is higher than the price ceiling. Of particular importance for the CAP is the maximum 
price intervention. The potential capitalisation of the CAP into land rents will be reduced in 
the presence of a rental price ceiling and thus will facilitate higher transfers of the CAP rents 
toward farms. An important implication for the rental price adjustments has also the duration 
of rental contracts. Ceteris paribus, long-term rental contracts for agricultural land will adjust 
less to external changes than short-term contracts. According to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 
(2010), the key determinants of rental contract duration in the EU are social norms (e.g. in 
Greece), governmental regulations (e.g. there is a minimum of 9 years in Belgium and France, 
6 years in the Netherlands and 5 in Spain), and market institutions (e.g. Germany, Italy, 
Sweden). Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the renewal of rental contracts is 
regulated. The implications of the rental contract duration on the CAP capitalisation are likely 
                                                
10 Before the 2003 CAP reform, the cross-compliance policies had environmental focus. Farmers were expected 
to comply with environmental protection requirements as a condition for benefiting from the CAP support. The 
2003 CAP reform made cross-compliance compulsory and extended the coverage of requirements in the fields of 
environment, public, animal and plant health and animal welfare. 9
more significant than the rental price regulations, because they are more widespread in the EU 
(Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010).
3. Econometric specification 
Solving the farm maximisation problem (equations (3)-(4)) and accounting for the SPS 
subsidies, farm income (profit) and land rents depend on the output price (p), the non-land 
input price (w), farm output (f) and decoupled and coupled subsidies (e and i s  for i=Q, A, Z)
suggesting the following econometric models:  
(7) jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f w p e s r                 4 3 2 1 0
(8) jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f adj r w p e s                    5 4 3 2 1 0 _
where subscripts i, j, t stand for the type of coupled subsidies (i=Q, A,Z), farm and time, 
respectively; and  jt X  is a vector of observable covariates such as farm characteristics, 
regional, and time variables. As usual,  jt   and  jt   are the residuals.
11
The main interest in our study are parameters  s   and  e   in rental equation, and  s   and  e   in 
profit equation. These parameters indicate the income distributional effects of subsidies: i.e. 
the policy rents of landowners ( s  , e  ) and farmers ( s  , e  ) per 1 Euro of coupled and 
decoupled CAP payments. 
The estimation of equations (7) and (8) is subject to several econometric issues. We identify 
three key issues: omitted variable bias, selection bias and endogeneity. Without addressing 
these issues it is impossible to obtain consistent estimates of the incidence of agricultural 
subsidies on farmland rental rates. In order, to control for these econometric issues we 
estimate three econometric models: the fixed effects model, the Heckman selection bias 
model and the generalised method of moment (GMM) model. 
Omitted variable bias 
Equations (7) and (8) contain the key variables determining the incidence of agricultural 
subsidies. In addition to these included explanatory variables, there are also unobservable 
farm characteristics, e.g. farmer ability, which affect land rental price and net farm income, 
and in the same time are correlated with explanatory variables in equations (7) and (8). 
Ignoring the unobserved farm heterogeneity would cause omitted variable bias. 
The panel structure of the FADN data allows us to control for the omitted variable bias. By 
employing properties of the panel data, the unobserved heterogeneity component that remains 
fixed over time can be controlled for thus eliminating or reducing considerably the omitted 
variable bias.
                                                
11 The definition of the rest of the variables is the same as in the theoretical section. 10
In order to control for unobserved permanent farm-level characteristics, we follow Kirwan 
(2005) and estimate fixed effects model, which yields: 
(9) jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s j jt X f w p e s b r                  4 3 2 1 0
(10) jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s j jt X f adj r w p e s d                     5 4 3 2 1 0 _
where j b  and  j d  are fixed effects for farm  j , which capture time-unvarying farm-specific 
characteristics. These fixed effects reflect farm heterogeneity, such as different technologies 
for different farms, different managerial skills or other unobservable fixed farm specific 
characteristics.
Selection bias
A significant number of farms in the FADN dataset do not rent any land. Because of missing 
left hand side variables, these farms are excluded from our sample. To control for the 
selection bias related to farms' rental market participation decisions, we employ the 
Heckman's sample selection model (Heckman 1979). 
One may expect that more dynamic farms and/or those with limited own land resources may 
be more inclined to participate on rental markets compared to less dynamic, part-time and/or 
subsistence farms. Farms with zero rentals will drop out from equation (7), as their land rental 
prices do not exist. If the farm rental decision is non-random, then the standard estimation 
approach would result in biased estimates. To control for the potential sample selection bias, 
we follow Heckman (1979) and adopt a two stage estimation approach. In the first stage, we 
examine the determinants of farms' decision to rent agricultural land using a Probit model.
12
In the second stage, we estimate the rental equation (7) in first differences. The selection bias 
is controlled for through inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) computed in the first 
stage.
13 This yields an empirically estimable Heckman's sample selection model, which 
controls for time-unvarying farm specific effects: 
(11) jt jt jt jt jt jt jt e ijt s jt X f w p e s r                         IMR 4 4 3 2 1
Although, the FADN sampling strategy is representative and methodologically consistent, 
theoretically, the estimation of equations (7) and (8) could also suffer from attrition bias. The 
FADN is an unbalanced panel, where every year 5 to 20 percent of farms are dropped from 
the sample. Farms are excluded either because of the FADN sampling strategy of regular 
annual replacement of observations and/or because of other reasons (voluntary drop-out, exit 
from farming). If some groups of farms drop out from the sample more frequently than others, 
                                                
12 The dependent variable hj is a dichotomous (1, 0) variable indicating whether the j-th farm rented land or not.
13 If IMR is significant in the second stage, it suggests there is significant bias in the initial model. However, one 
potential limitation of the Heckman method is that if the Heckman in the selection model is not well-specified, 
the IMR may be weaker than expected and the Heckman method may have limited power to detect bias. As a 
result, a second factor to examine following the addition of the IMR variable into the initial specification models 
is whether or not there have been significant changes in any of the parameter estimates. 11
then the standard estimators would yield biased results. Therefore, we test also for the attrition 
bias. We find no significant impact on the estimated coefficients.
14
Endogeneity
Three sources of endogeneity might bias our estimates. If subsidies were assigned to farms 
randomly, then parameters  s   and  e   in the rental equation and parameters  s   and  e   in the 
profit equation would measure the share of each extra subsidy Euro per hectare reflected in 
higher rental rates. In reality, however, subsidies  ijt s  and  jt e  are not assigned randomly to 
farms. For example, the coupled animal and crop subsidies depend on regional and farm level 
productivities. The coupled subsidies are allocated to each MS based on regional 
productivities (e.g. regional reference yield). At farm level the size of subsidies depends on 
the MS subsidy size (i.e. regional productivity) and on the farms' crop choice (e.g. supported 
versus non-supported crops). Similar holds for the SAPS in the new MS. Although, the SAPS 
is not based on farm productivities directly, it is nevertheless correlated with the pre-accession 
average country/regional productivities, because the base for the CAP application in new MS 
was the average production level and intensity in the pre-accession period. This implies that 
the SAPS is exogenous at farm level within each new MS but endogenous between the new 
MS. The decoupled SPS payments depend on the past coupled payments and on the average 
country/regional productivities, because the value of the SPS was set based on regional 
productivities or/and farm past level of subsidies. The RDP (investment support, 
environmental payments) are allocated to farmers based on project submission. Only those 
farms which submit and have a successful project are granted the support. Hence the RDP is 
non-random because farms self-select to participate and only those with the best projects 
(likely the more productive farms) are granted the RDP support.  This structure of coupled 
and decoupled CAP subsidies implies that they are endogenous variables reflecting the 
characteristics of country/regions’ land and farmer’s behaviour. Hence, subsidies are not 
assigned randomly, which implies that subsidy payments are correlated with the error term. 
As a result, the resulting standard OLS estimates of ( s  , e  ) and ( s  , e  ) may be biased. 
A further source of endogeneity is simultaneity bias arising from adjustments in farmer 
behaviour due to subsidy payments. The support programmes typically encourage more input 
use and production of supported commodities than in absence of subsidies. If subsidies were 
removed, the relative input and output market prices would change. Therefore, the subsidies 
and prices are (partially) co-determined. A regression approach which does not control for 
price changes would overestimate or underestimate the subsidy effects depending on the 
direction of price changes.
Finally, market prices and subsidy payments are subject to a expectation error. The difference 
between the actual and the expected market prices/subsidies is the expectation error, which is 
part of the composite error term potentially causing unreliable estimates. Farm decisions are 
                                                
14 The results are available upon request from the authors. 12
based on a combination of the current and pre-harvesting information. The expectation error 
is less problematic for subsidies in the short-medium run, because they are set beforehand
15
and in general are known to farmers. However, some uncertainty may exist particularly with 
respect to coupled subsidies (e.g. crop payments), because they are subject to downward 
correction at farm level, if the sum of all farm application for subsidies exceeds the national 
ceilings. A further source of expectation error is uncertainty about the future CAP reforms. 
However, this error is less problematic for profits and rents, because they tend to be 
determined based on yearly market adjustments.
16
These endogeneity problems may lead to biased estimates not only for subsidies but also for 
output and input prices. To address this source of endogeneity, we employ the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) robust two-step GMM estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that 
lagged endogenous variables are valid instrument in panel data setting. This allows us to use 
lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments (additionally to exogenous 
variables), after the equation has been first-differenced to eliminate the farm specific effects. 
The GMM estimator is particularly suitable for datasets with a large number of cross-sections 
and few periods and it requires that there is no autocorrelation. The FADN dataset matches 
these requirements, because it is a panel data and contains a very large number of farm-level 
observations relative to the period covered. Given that the robust two-step GMM standard 
errors can be severely downward biased, we use the Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust 
variances. 
4. Data and variable construction 
The main source of the data used in the empirical analysis is the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN), which is compiled and maintained by the European Commission. The 
FADN is a European system of sample surveys that take place each year and collect structural 
and accountancy data on the farms. In total there is information about 150 variables on farm 
structure, yield, output, costs, subsidies and taxes, income, balance sheet, and financial 
indicators. Sample sizes vary from country to country (roughly between 500 and 20 000 
observations, while most countries have about 1 500-10 000) representing a population of 
around 5,000,000 farms, covering approximately 90% of the total utilised agricultural area 
and accounting for more than 90% of the total agricultural production. The aggregate FADN 
data are publicly available. However, farm-level data are confidential and, for the purposes of 
this study, accessed under a special agreement.  
To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised 
(the bookkeeping principles are the same across all EU Member States) and is representative 
of the commercial agricultural holdings in the whole EU. Farms are selected to take part in 
                                                
15 The CAP is adopted within multiannual programming frameworks. 
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the survey on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of each region in the EU. 
The survey does not, however, cover all the agricultural holdings in the Union, but only those 
which are of a size allowing them to rank as commercial holdings. 
The FADN data is a panel dataset, which means that farms that stay in the sample over 
consecutive years can be traced over time using a unique identifier. In this study we use panel 
data for 1995-2007 covering all EU MS except Romania and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria 
were excluded from the sample, because for these countries the data were available only for 
one year (2007). 
The description of constructed variables is presented in Table 2. The dependent variable in 
equation (7) ( jt r ) - land rental price - is constructed from the FADN data by dividing the total 
amount of rent paid for farm land and rental charges with the total utilised agricultural area 
(UAA) rented by the holder under a tenancy agreement for a period of at least one year. The 
dependent profit variable in equation (8) ( jt  ) – net farm income – is calculated by 
subtracting taxes, variable expenses (intermediate, land, labour) and fixed costs (depreciation 
and interest payments) from the total farm revenues (output and subsidies). We estimate 
equation (8) per hectare, which means that we divide the obtained net farm income with the 
utilised agricultural area. 
Similarly, all subsidy variables (coupled crop area payments, coupled animal payments,
decoupled payments (SPS and SAPS), investment support, environmental payments and LFA)
(e and i s  for i=Q, A, Z) are constructed from the FADN data and are calculated on per-
hectare basis. Every agricultural producer in the FADN survey is asked to report both the total 
subsidies received as well as to specify the amount by major subsidy types. To account for 
taxes and other types of subsidies, we construct variable other subsidies by subtracting taxes 
from rest of the farm payments not included in the above payment categories.  
Also the output and input control variables in equations (7) and (8) ( jt w , jt adj r _,   jt f ) are 
constructed from the FADN data. To account for the output and input price adjustments we 
include market return, wage, other inputs and adjusted rental price (only for income equation 
(8)). The market return variable is constructed by dividing the total farm output by the total 
utilised agricultural area. The wage variable is constructed as a weighted average of the 
regional mean wage and farm specific wage. The variable other inputs includes crop/animal-
specific inputs (seeds and seedlings, fertilisers, crop protection products, feed, other specific 
costs), overheads, depreciation and interest costs. It is constructed as a weighted average of 
the sectoral/regional mean and farm specific value and it is divided by the UAA. Similarly, 
the adjusted rental price is a weighted average of the regional/sectoral rate and farm specific 
rent. We utilise weighted input costs (i.e. wage, other inputs and rents) of the regional/sectoral 
mean and farm-specific values in order to control for three factors: regional opportunity 14
values of inputs, measurement error potentially present at farm level data
17 as well as farm 
specific effects (e.g. labour skill differences, land quality at farm, farm specific technology).  
The covariates matrix,  jt X , includes other explanatory variables, which affect land rents and 
farm income. The land rented ratio and labour own ratio are included in equations to control 
for potential differences in incentives between own and rented/hired land/labour as well as to 
account for higher cost level of farms using rented/hired land/labour. Additionally, in order to 
account for differences in rental contracts, we construct variable sharecropped land by 
dividing farm area under share cropping by the UAA. A variable capturing the economic size 
(farm size) of farms is also available from the FADN data. The economic size of farms is 
expressed in European size units. To account for non-agricultural pressures on agricultural 
sector, we include agricultural area per capita (land per capita). In order to account for the 
various technological, sectoral and regional covariates, we include variables accounting for 
effects such as irrigated land, area under glass, fallow land, credit and capital availability and 
sectoral, regional and time dummies (for more details see Table 2). In general, the dummy 
variables capture unobserved heterogeneities, which represent common characteristics for all 
farms but which may differ between regions, such as informal and formal rural institutions, 
differences in climatic conditions, and market imperfections. 
Variables used in the GMM regressions are structured in endogenous and exogenous and are 
summarised in Table 3.
18 To reduce the endogeneity problem between various types of 
subsidies and to reduce the number of instruments, we merge the subsidy types into four main 
groups: RDP (investment support, environmental payments, LFA), coupled payments (crop 
area payments, animal payments) decoupled payments (SPS, SAPS), other subsidies (the rest 
of subsidies minus taxes). To account for the dynamic adjustment of rents and farm income, 
we create lagged dependent (2 lags) and lagged explanatory (0 and 1) variables. For all 
endogenous variables, we use the first lag as an instrument alongside the exogenous variables 
and lagged dependent variables. The choice of lags for instruments was selected by checking 
the validity of different sets of instruments. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Main findings 
We estimate the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates in three 
alternative models: the fixed effects model, the Heckman sample selection model and the first 
difference GMM model. Table 4 reports the fixed effects panel data estimates in levels, where 
                                                
17 For example, regional averages were utilised for farms with missing wage, rental price and other costs data 
(because of zero labour hiring and zero land renting). 
18 The agricultural employment is relatively low in the overall EU employment (around 2-5%) implying that 
farms are likely price taker on the labour market and hence the wage rate is most likely exogenous for individual 
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the dependent variables are net farm income (columns 1-3) and land rental price (columns 4-
6). Additional to the complete income and rental equation specification in columns 1 and 4, 
we add lag dependent variable in specifications 3 and 4 and, following Dewbre and Mishra 
(2007), we exclude variables potentially causing multicollinearity in specification 2 and 5. 
Generally, the farm income models yield significantly ‘better’ estimates than the rental price 
models. For example, most of the estimated coefficients have the expected sign in the income 
equation, and market returns have a positive and significant impact on farm income whereas 
inputs costs reduce farm income (columns 1-3). This is not the case for the rental equation, 
where input variables are either statistically insignificant or they have a positive sign 
although, according to our expectations, market returns increase land rents (columns 4-6).     
Both the income and land rent coefficients weakly increase with farm size, which may reflect 
the presence of economies of scale. The land abundance variable (land per capita) is positive 
and significant for income equation but not for the rental equation. The rented land ratio
reduces both income and land rents. Profits are affected because of lower incentive associated 
with the use of rented land and because of higher costs of farms relying on rented land as 
opposed to farms owning land. Rental rates might decrease because of lower incentive 
associated with the use of rented land. Sharecropped land ratio has a positive sign but is not 
statistically significant in most of the estimated models. Own labour (labour own ratio)
increases farm profits because of cost reducing effect. Contrary to our expectations, own 
labour reduces land rents as, due to incentive differences between family and hired labour, 
one would expect the opposite sign (e.g. Pollak 1985; Allen and Lueck 1998). The coefficient 
associated with the output livestock ratio is statistically insignificant. Higher farm own 
consumption reduces farm income and land rents, which possibly is because of smaller 
market orientation of farms producing for self-consumption. The liabilities-to-assets ratio
increase income and land rants, which may indicate the presence of farm credit constraint. 
All estimated models suggest that subsidies significantly influence farm income (columns 1-3, 
Table 4). The estimates are relatively stable across the models except for the coupled crop and 
animal payments, which suggest their correlation with the excluded variables in specification 
2, such as market returns and input prices (column 2 in Table 4). As discussed in the previous 
section, the regional and farm level productivities represent a strong determinant of coupled 
CAP subsidies. Our estimates imply that the net farm income increases between 0.77 EUR 
and 1.65 EUR for each subsidy EUR
19. Surprisingly, the estimated subsidy coefficients are 
particularly high for LFA and coupled crop area payments for farm income. According to the 
theoretical predictions, both should be capitalised into land rents and benefit landowners 
instead of farmers. As expected the decoupled payment estimates (between 0.89 and 0.92) are 
slightly higher than the estimates for coupled crop/animal payments and the investment 
support (between 0.60 and 0.90). In contrast, the environmental payments generate slightly 
                                                
19 The subsidy farm income effect higher than 1.00 may be caused by the interaction of subsidies with the farm 
credit constraint leading to productivity upgrade and hence higher farm income (Ciaian and Swinnen 2009). 16
higher farm income effect (between 0.85 and 1.00) compared to decoupled payments, which 
is contrary to the theoretical expectations. These results may suggest that they do not induce 
farm behavioural effects, e.g. additional costs.  
Although, the estimates of the income distributional effects of subsidies reported in Table 4 
are rather high, they are consistent with other studies. For example, Henningsen, Kumbhakar 
and Lien (2009) report that the intermediate input subsidies have a negative impact on 
farmers' income in Norway (i.e. -0.39), while output subsidies and decoupled payments fully 
benefit farmers (1.02 and 1.00, respectively). The estimates of Dewbre and Mishra (2007) for 
US range between 0.96 and 0.97 for decoupled payments and between 0.50 and 0.83 for 
coupled payments. 
Regarding the land rental price equation, the estimates of subsidy effects are statistically 
significant for roughly half of the variables, but their values are relatively low (less than 0.05), 
implying that subsidies are not an important determinant of land rents (columns 4-6, Table 
4).
20 These findings contradict the empirical studies from the US, which find that the 
capitalisation rate for coupled and decoupled subsidies is between 20-100%.
21 Among the 
possible explanations behind the relatively low estimates could be strict rental market 
regulations in the EU, and identification issues. In addition, the rental costs in the FADN data 
include not only farm land rents, but also rents for buildings and other rental charges. 
Although, we made an attempt to correct for this data issue,
22 the data may still contain a 
measurement error bias.  
Table 5 reports the Heckman first-difference estimates for rental equation, which controls for 
the rental market participation bias. The coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio, which tests the 
impact of rental market participation bias, fails to be significant and parameter estimates of 
subsidies are to a large extent consistent with the fixed effects estimates reported in Table 4, 
which confirms that the CAP subsidies are capitalised into land rents at a low rate.   
The GMM estimates are shown in Table 6.
23 As usual, we start with diagnostic tests. We 
employ the Arellano-Bond statistics to test for serial dependence of errors. The tests indicate 
                                                
20 Table 7 and Table 8 report fixed effect estimates for selected MS. The results are largely consistent with the 
EU level estimates where CAP subsidies generate a substantial policy gain to farmers but not to landowners. 
21 The empirical findings from the studies on land capitalisation of agricultural subsidies can be summarised as 
follows: (i) Landowners do benefit from all type of subsidies, both coupled and decoupled. (ii) Land 
capitalisation of coupled subsidies (based on US studies) varies between 20% and (more than) 100%. (iii) Land 
capitalisation of decoupled subsidies (based on US studies) varies between 20% and 90%. (iv) Subsidies and 
market returns show similar level of the land capitalisation rate. The land capitalisation of the market returns is 
between 20% and 80%. (v) The impact of coupled subsidies is lower than the theory predicts: land rents/prices 
do not appear to capture the full value of coupled subsidies, at least in the short to medium run, but they do 
capture a substantive amount of subsidy payments. (vi) The impact of decoupled subsidies is stronger than 
expected from the theory. This can be explained, for example, by the conditionality of the support on other 
policy measures (Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magné 2003, 2005; Lence and Mishra 2003; Roberts, Kirwan, 
and Hopkins 2003; Kirwan 2005; Barnard, et al. 1997; Taylor and Brester 2005). 
22 For example by excluding high value rents which may represents rental for buildings. 
23 The variables employed in GMM are summarised in Table 3. 17
strong evidence against the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
errors at order 1 but confirm no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 2 in 
both the rental and income equations. Serial correlation of order higher than 1 would imply 
misspecification of the model. The test for the validity of instruments performs better for the 
income equation than for the rental equation. The Sargan test statistics indicates that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid for the income 
equation. However, for the rental price equation, the test rejects the null hypothesis, implying 
that instruments may be correlated with the residuals and thus fail to fulfil the exogeneity 
condition. The Sargan test rejection may be also a result of heteroskedasticity. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) found tendency for this test to be under-rejected in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. To account for heteroskedasticity, we follow Windmeijer (2005) and use 
robust standard errors. 
Generally, the GMM results reported in Table 6 are fairly consistent with the fixed effects 
results reported in Table 4 for the income equation (columns 1 and 2). The consistency is 
particularly strong in terms of sign for all parameters and of magnitude for parameters 
corresponding to subsidies, market return and input prices. The rental equation shows 
significant changes in the sign, magnitude and significance level for all parameters compared 
to the fixed effects results (columns 3 and 4). These results confirm that the rental equation 
does not respond well to variables predicted by the theory. The majority of the estimated 
coefficients corresponding to subsidies, market return and input prices are not significant. A 
strong determinant of rents appears to be lagged values of rents, indicating the rigidity of 
rental markets potentially induced by rental price regulations and long durations of rental 
contracts. In the presence of rental price thresholds and long durations of rental contracts, land 
rents do not adjust to market signals but tend to stay unchanged over time, which may lead to 
a lagged dependency between rents. Additionally, rents are responsive to control variables 
such as farm size, land rented ratio, output livestock ratio, indicating that the farm structural 
differences are strong determinants of rental rates.
According to the results reported in Table 6, a substantial share of the CAP payments benefit 
farms (columns 1 and 2). Relative to the fixed effects results (Table 4), the RDP and coupled
payments tend to generate higher gains to farmers whereas decoupled payments induce 
slightly lower benefits if lagged effects are not taken into account (model 1). Accounting for 
the lagged dependencies (model 2), the contemporaneous farm income effect of subsidies is 
reduced, and the lagged coefficients of subsidies are not statistically significant. The estimates 
in Table 6 indicate that farmers benefit between 0.81 to 0.95 EUR, 0.81 to 0.86 EUR and 
more than 1.00 EUR for each payment EUR of coupled, decupled and RDP payments, 
respectively (columns 1 and 2). For the rental equation most of the coefficients measuring the 
subsidy capitalisation into land rents are statistically not significant (Table 6, columns 3 and 
4).18
5.2. Identification issues and limitations 
The estimated results reported in Table 4 to Table 6 show that capitalization of the CAP 
subsidies into land rents is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions saying that a 
substantial share of all types of CAP subsidies benefit landowners (see the theoretical section 
2). Two issues may yield these results: governmental regulations and rental market 
institutions, and identification problem. 
The extensive governmental regulations and rental market institutions (minimum/maximum 
price; long-term rental contracts) in the EU may prevent land rents to adjust to policy 
changes. A study of Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010) reports the presence of important 
rental market regulations including rental price restrictions (minimum/maximum price) and 
the regulations on the duration of rental contracts. The rental price restrictions are in general 
imposed by government whereas the duration of rental contracts can be implemented by both 
formal governmental interventions and/or through informal rural market institutions. 
According to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010),
24 several MS implement minimum or 
maximum rental prices such as Belgium, France, Greece and the Netherlands. These price 
interventions (particularly the maximum price) may reduce the transmission of subsidies into 
land rents. An even more important implication on the rental price adjustments has the long-
term duration of rental contracts because, according to Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen (2010), 
they tend to be more widespread than rental price regulations. For example, several countries 
have the average duration of rental contracts longer than 5 years (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, and Spain). In Italy the average duration is 2 to 5 years for arable 
crops and 5 to 10 years for fruit crops (Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2010). The long-term 
duration of rental contracts makes rental markets stickier and the time lag for the adjustment 
to policy changes takes a longer time period.  
An important shortcoming of the FADN rental data is that it does not contain any information 
about the farm rental contracts and rental market regulations (e.g. contract type, contract 
duration, maximum rental price), which would allow to control for the rental market 
institutions. For example, to control for the rental contract duration, Patton et al. (2008) 
exclude from their sample in Northern Ireland all farms with the duration of contracts longer 
than one year and find (contrary to our empirical finding) high coupled subsidy capitalisation 
into land rents (between 0.40 and 1.20). Similarly, Kilian et al (2008) consider a variable 
measuring the share of newly signed rental contracts in order to estimate the difference in land 
capitalisation rate between the SPS and the pervious coupled subsidies in Bavaria (Germany). 
Their estimates indicate that the SPS is capitalised by additional 15% to 19% above the 
previous coupled subsidies. However, since Kilian et al (2008) use a cross-section data, they 
are not able to control for unobserved farm specific effects.  
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Particularly the rental price estimates may suffer from identification problems. If the law of 
one (rental) price holds, then the cross-sectional variation in rental price in each region/MS is 
independent of the subsidy variation at farm level, whereas the time variation in rental price, 
which may be induced by change in the subsidies, will be captured by regional/time dummies, 
or other region/country specific variables. This is because the equilibrium market rental price 
adjustments are determined by overall marginal and not by the farm specific marginal change 
of subsidies. In other words, the law of one price implies that the variation in land rents is not 
farm-specific but the rental prices tend to respond to policy or market changes at the same rate 
for all farms in a given region/MS. For farm income estimates this is less of a problem, 
because profits are farm specific and are determined by both farm and region specific 
variables (including subsidies).
6. Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the distributional effects of the CAP subsidies between farmers and 
landowners. First, we theoretically analyse the farmers' and landowners' benefits from 
different types of CAP subsidies: coupled direct payments (crop area payments, animal 
payments); coupled RDP measures (investment support, LFA, and environmental payments); 
and decoupled direct payments (SPS and SAPS) granted to EU farmers under the present 
CAP. In empirical analysis we use the FADN farm level panel data for the period 1995-2007 
to estimate the incidence of agricultural subsidies on farmland rental rates and farm income. 
According to the theoretical results, the ranking of income distributional effects between 
farmers and landowners depends on the type of the CAP payments. However, in well 
functioning markets, landowners are found to benefit a large share of all types of CAP 
subsidies through their capitalisation into land rents. This is due to inelastic land supply, 
which does not allow adjustments in land supply. The only channel of land market adjustment 
is rental price, when subsidies induce stronger competition for agricultural inputs. In 
particular, landowners are expected to gain proportionally more from CAP subsidies linked to 
land (e.g. crop area payments, LFA) than farmers (and other market agents), because land 
subsidies directly stimulate land market and because of inelastic land supply. Farmers and 
landowners are expected to share the benefit (losses) from output subsidies and non-land 
input subsidies (e.g. investment support, environmental payments). However, because of 
inelastic land supply, landowners may also benefit a substantial share of non-land input and 
output subsidies. Theoretically, the decoupled subsidies are expected to have a mixed impact 
on incomes of landowners and farmers. They may result in high capitalisation rates leading in 
such a way to considerable leakage of policy gains to landowners. This is the case of the 
SAPS and, if entitlements are surplus relative to the eligible area, also the case of the SPS. In 
this case both the SAPS and the SPS create similar market incentives as land based subsidies. 
However, as long as the number of eligible area exceeds the number of entitlements, the SPS 
benefit farmers.20
We employ the fixed effects, the Heckman sample selection model and the GMM estimators 
to estimate the distributional effects of CAP subsidies. The empirical results do not confirm 
the theoretical predictions, whereby landowners benefit a large proportion of the CAP 
subsidies. In contrast, our estimates suggest that farmers benefit the major share of all types of 
CAP subsidies (RDP, coupled and decupled payments). According to our results, farmers gain 
more than 60% of CAP payments, i.e. they gain 60% to 95%, 86% to 90% and 80% to 178% 
of coupled, decupled and RDP payments, respectively. Our estimates are relatively robust 
with respect to different specifications and estimation approaches. 
In contrast, landowners are found to benefit only marginally from subsidies; the coefficient 
estimates are either statistically not significant or their magnitudes are close to zero. These 
estimates could change, if, for example, improved rental contract data becomes available (e.g. 
duration of rental contract; presence of new contracts). Further, our results suggest that 
farmland rental rates are more responsive to structural variables (farm size, farm 
specialisation, importance of renting) than to variables predicted by the theory (market 
returns, input prices, subsidies). Additionally, the empirical results confirm a strong time 
dependency between the land rents (i.e. current rental rates depend on the lagged rents), 
suggesting that the presence of rigidities on the EU rental markets (rental price regulations 
and prevalence of long duration of rental contracts) may considerably constrain the rental 
price adjustments and thus reduce the landowners gains from subsidies relative to farmers. At 
the same time, the dependency of rental price on structural variables may indicate the 
identification problem of the farm level variation of subsidies on land rents. This is because, if 
the law of one (rental) price holds, the cross-sectional and the time variation in rental price in 
each region/MS is independent of the subsidy variation at farm level but it is likely correlated 
and captured by the time and/or region/country specific dummy variables. 
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Table 2. Description of variables
Variable name  Description 
Dependent variables 
Land rental price Total value of rent paid for farm land and buildings and rental charges divided with the 
UAA rented by the holder under a tenancy agreement for a period of at least one year
Net farm income
Total farm revenues (output and subsidies) minus taxies, variable expenses 
(intermediate, land, labour) depreciation, and interest payments. The obtained value is 
divided with UAA to obtain hectare value of farm income 
Explanatory variables 
Coupled crop area payments Hectare value of all farm subsidies on crops, including compensatory payments/area 
payments and set-aside premiums  
Coupled animal payments Hectare value of all farm subsidies on livestock and livestock products 
Decoupled payments Hectare value of SPS and SAPS 
Investment support Hectare value of subsidies on investments 
Environmental payments  Hectare value of environmental subsidies; including part of the measures of the article 69 
of Regulation 1782/2003 
LFA  Hectare value of LFA subsidies 
Other subsidies  Hectare value of other coupled and RDP not included in the above subsidy categories 
minus taxes 
Market return  Hectare value of total output of crops and crop products, livestock and livestock products 
and of other output 
Adjusted rental price  
Weighted average of the regional/sectoral mean rent and farm specific rent. The regional 
mean rent is averaged by NUTS 2 and output specialisation. The farm rent is calculated 
by dividing rent paid for farm land and buildings and rental charges with total rented 
area.  
Wage
Weighted average of the regional mean wage and farm specific wage. The regional mean 
wage is averaged over NUTS 2. The farm wage is calculated by dividing wages and 
social security charges by total hired labour.  
Other inputs 
Weighted average of the regional/sectoral mean and farm specific value of other inputs. 
The regional mean value of other inputs is averaged by NUTS 2 and output 
specialisation. The farm rent is hectare value of crop/animal-specific inputs (seeds and 
seedlings, fertilisers, crop protection products, feed, other specific costs), overheads, 
depreciation and interest costs. 
Land rented ratio  Ratio of rented area to UAA 
Labour own ratio  Ratio of unpaid input to total labour 
Sharecropped land  Ratio of sharecropped land to UAA 
Farm size  Economic size of holding expressed in European size units (ESU) 
Land per capita  Ratio of total agricultural area to total population at MS level 
Irrigated land ratio  Ratio of irrigated land to UAA
Glass land ratio  Ratio of the area under glass or plastic land to UAA 
Fallow land ratio  Ratio of fallow and set-aside land to UAA 
Woodland ratio  Ratio of woodland area to UAA 
Output livestock ratio  Ratio of total livestock output to total farm output 
Own-consumption ratio  Ratio of farmhouse consumption and farm use to total output 
Liabilities-to-assets ratio  Ratio of total liabilities to total farm assets 
Farm product stock  Stock of agricultural products divided by UAA 
Investment  Gross Investment divided by UAA 
Building-machinery per ha  Value of Buildings and machinery divided by UAA 
Lu  Total livestock units 
List of dummy variables 
Year, sector, country, LFA region and their interaction terms.
Note: All variable are calculated from the FADN data except for the variable land per capita which uses 
agricultural land from the FAOSTAT and total population from the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates 
Database. 26
Table 3. Variables used in the GMM estimation  
 Variable  name  Lags 
Dependent variable     
  Land rental price  2 
 Net  farm  income  2 
Endogenous variables     
  RDP  0 and 1 
  Coupled payments  0 and 1 
  Decoupled payments  0 and 1 
  Other subsidies  0 and 1 
  Market return  0 and 1 
  Adjusted rental price  0 and 1 
  Other inputs  0 and 1 
  Building-machinery per ha  1 
  Farm product stock  0 and 1 
 Investment  1 
Exogenous variables     
Wage, Farm size,  
Land per capita, Land rented ratio, Sharecropped land 
ratio, Labour own ratio, Output livestock ratio, Own-
consumption ratio, Liabilities-to-assets ratio, and other 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. Heckman first difference estimates of land rental price for EU 
Land rental price
Investment support  0.00879*** 
Environmental payments  0.00715** 
LFA 0.0299*** 
Coupled crop area payments  0.00785*** 
Coupled animal payments  0.00990*** 
Decoupled payments  -0.00763*** 
Other subsidies  -0.000645 
Market return  0.00602*** 
Wage 0.000350*** 
Adjusted rental price   
Other inputs  0.00172*** 
Farm size  0.00220 
Land per capita  81.23*** 
Land rented ratio  -194.5*** 
Sharecropped land  11.88 
Labour own ratio  -14.68*** 
Output livestock ratio  0.734 
Own-consumption ratio  -4.545** 
Liabilities_ass_ratiod1 8.466*** 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)  0.868 
Constant -103.9 
Observations 557048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: for the sake of conciseness not all variables are reported29
Table 6. Arellano and Bond estimates of farm income and land rental price for EU 
  Net farm income   Land rental price
 (1)    (2)    (3)  (4) 
RDP 1.782***    1.328***    -0.101**  -0.0577 
RDP(-1)     -0.264    -  0.0145 
Coupled payments  0.950***    0.815***    -0.0176  -0.0212 
Coupled payments(-1)      0.158    -  0.0129 
Decoupled payments  0.864***    0.812***    -0.0131  -0.0188 
Decoupled payments(-1)      0.123    -  0.0134 
Other subsidies  1.275**    0.953    -0.00184  0.125 
Other subsidies(-1)      0.755    -  0.0302 
            
Market return  0.972***    0.914***    -0.00303  0.00322 
Market return(-1)  -    0.101      -0.00237 
Wage -0.00310***    -0.00251*    -0.000362*  -0.000264 
Wage(-1) -    -0.00262*    -  0.000434** 
Adjusted rental price  -0.0517    0.174    -  - 
Adjusted rental price(-1)  -    -0.442    -  - 
Other inputs  -0.901***    -0.890***    0.00499  0.00171 
Other inputs(-1)  -    -0.296**    -  0.0146 
Net farm income(-1)  0.0285*    -0.0707    -  - 
Net farm income(-2)  0.00975    0.0137    -  - 
Land rental price(-1)  -    -    0.470***  0.484*** 
Land rental price(-2)  -    -    0.116***  0.118*** 
            
Farm size  0.338    0.289    -0.0394*  -0.0460* 
Land per capita  1,388***    1,333***    -51.53  -48.17 
Land rented ratio  587.9***    488.5**    -640.0***  -638.9*** 
Sharecropped land ratio  281.1***    343.9***    -118.8**  -107.8** 
Labour own ratio  2,352***    2,420***    13.85  27.49 
Output livestock ratio  -121.4***    -104.1**    17.70***  14.72** 
Own-consumption ratio  -302.4***    -358.4***    -17.28*  -16.21 
Liabilities-to-assets ratio  21.61    -207.0    10.34  22.05 
Constant -48,542***    -61,651***    6,179  8,002* 
            
Observations 116920    116431    76584  76362 
Number of idn  47345    47291    30347  30321 
            
Sargan test (Prob > chi2)  0.1312    0.1880    0.0000  0.0000 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test           
    AR(1) (Prob > z)  0.0000    0.0001    0.0000  0.0000 
    AR(2) (Prob > z)  0.5214    0.4949    0.1108  0.1133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Estimates are based on the period 2000-2007; For the sake of conciseness not all 
variables are reported3
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